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LAISSEZ-FAIRE OR MANDATORY AUDITOR ROTATION:  
THE CASE OF AUDIT FIRM TENURE AND AUDIT FIRM SWITCHING 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
The issue of audit tenure has been discussed since four decades age.  Nowadays, due to the 
recent corporate scandals in the United States, the issue is discussed together with auditor 
independence that led to companies’ demise.   Therefore, this study attempts to investigate 
the situation in Malaysia whereby no empirical study using archival data has been done.    
 
There are two major findings. First, the variable of audit firm tenure is positive ly significant 
relationship with going concern opinion. Second, when a client never changes its auditor 
since became a public listed company; there is a tendency to issue a clean opinion though the 
client suffers apparent financial problems.  This implies that, “auditor change would do well, 
but forcing an unrealistic auditor rotation might not yield what it hopes for”. Therefore, we 
echo the importance of self- regulation and Laissez-faire practice in Malaysia as a better 
alternative than a mandatory auditor rotation.   
 
Keywords: Audit Firm Tenure, Audit Firm Switching, Laissez-faire, Mandatory Auditor   
                  Rotation 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
The purpose of this study is to examine the effect of audit firm tenure on the issuance of 
going concern opinion.  Our sample is companies listed on the Kuala Lumpur Stock 
Exchange (KLSE). In addition, we examine the independence of audit committee and Big 
Five firms on the issuance of going concern opinion.  Prior to 1998, the Malaysian Institute of 
Accountants (MIA) did not adopt the International Auditing Guideline (IAG) 23 on 
assessment of going concern assumption. Later, in 1998, the MIA adopted ISA 570 Going 
Concern in which issued by the International Federation of Accountants (IFAC).  Then the 
standard revised in the year of 2000 and became operative from January 2002. Among 
significant changes between IAG 23 and ISA 570 include provision to assess going concern 
assumption in every audit engagement and additional prescription to guide practitioners in 
detecting going concern problem. 
 
Since the auditor is an agent to the shareholders in monitoring managers’ duties to create 
wealth for the principals (shareholders), auditor’s failure to inform shareholders on the going 
concern of the principal’s business is a serious matter.  With the introduction of the US 
Sarbanes Oxley, auditor’s relationship with the client is now being regulated to at least of the 
engagement audit partner’s tenure. The length of tenure of an audit firm maintains a client 
has long been an issue in the United States and other countries (Mautz and Sharaf, 1961; 
Shockley, 1981; Arrunada and Paz-Ares, 1997; and Geiger and Raghunandan, 2002).  Such 
long-term relationships could, in reality or be perceived to, make the audit firms too 
committed or beholden to the companies, thereby undermining its independence, 
compromising its objectivity, and reducing its effectiveness (The Star, 2002).  Several 
countries in European Union such as Italy and Spain have required the audit firms to be 
rotated by a certain time (Geiger and Raghunandan, 2002). However, even in such a 
mandatory auditor rotation regime, there is insufficient evidence to suggest that audit quality 
is improved by this means.   For example, the latest scandal involves a company namely 
Parmalat in Italy complied with a law that requires companies to change their auditors every 
nine years.  The discovery of losses amounting to RM41.8 billion in Parmalat has provoked 
outrage across continent of Europe and proves that the  law of auditor rotation still does not 
help to improve audit quality (The News Straits Times, Dec. 27, 2003). 
  
In the past few years, auditors had been blamed due to the role of themselves in the mega 
corporate scandals such as Enron Incorporation, WorldCom Incorporation, Global Crossing, 
ImClone Systems Incorporation and Tyco International.  Such criticism had raised lots of 
questions regarding auditors’ independence.  Besides, such criticism was levelled against 
auditors because they audit their clients for a long time and subsequent ly concentrated more 
on non-audit services rather than audit.  For example in the case of Enron, Andersen was the 
auditor since Enron was set up until collapsed.  For that reason, there has been a call for 
sweeping changes in the auditing profession to ensure independence and therefore improve 
their audit quality (The Star, Aug, 12, 2002).  
 
It is often argued that mandatory auditor rotation is one of the solutions to solve auditor’s 
cozy relationship with their clients. Auditor rotation supporters argue that its benefits stem 
from greater audit independence, which in turn improves audit quality. However, the cost of 
imposing mandatory auditor rotation would lead to higher start-up cost, impedes learning 
curve, as well as the failures to attract new-blood to the accounting profession and lower 
investment from the audit firms to enhance knowledge and expertise in certain industries 
(Petty & Cuganesan, 1996).  In the case of Malaysia where foreign direct investment is still a 
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major economic contributor, the country looks less attractive than its neighbouring 
counterparts especially Singapore since the appointment of auditors is usually for the 
company affairs and not for regulators as stated under Section 9 (6) of the Malaysian 
Companies Act 1965.  
 
In ASEAN, the Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS) has requisitioned all banks 
incorporated in Singapore to change their audit firms every five years under a new ruling. 
The new audit requirement is one of a series of control measures on corporate governance 
introduced by the Singapore authorities (The Star, March, 14, 2002).  According to Ravi 
Menon, executive director of the authority’s supervisory policy and banking departments, the 
mandatory audit firm rotation would help prevent audit firms from having excessive focus on 
maintaining long-term commercial relationships with the banks they audit.  However, in 
Malaysia there is no regulation binding the banks or the companies to change the audit firms 
within a certain period.  
 
THE MOTIVATION OF THE STUDY 
 
The most important motivation to carry out this study is lack of consensus among the public, 
regulators and audit firms on the issue of mandatory audit firm rotation. Teoh and Lim (1996) 
found that in Malaysia, the public perceived audit firm rotation would improve auditor 
independence. However, recently, the MIA suggested a more lenient way to regulate auditor 
independence.   A call of a mandatory rotation involve only audit partner but not audit firm as 
a whole.  The MIA recommended that there should be a mandatory rotation of the audit 
partners responsible for the audit of listed companies after a period of not more than five 
years. Furthermore, the audit partner rotating after such period should not resume the role of 
audit engagement partner for the audit client until two years have elapsed.  Prior to this 
pronouncement, in 1999, the MIA under its former president, Datuk Hanifah Noordin, called 
for a mandatory rotation of external auditors in every three or five years (New Straits Times, 
March 26, 1999).  
 
Following the corporate scandals in the United States, the regulators in Malaysia such as the 
Malaysia Securities Commission (SC) and the KLSE became more concerned with the 
mandatory audit firms rotation.  In view of the importance of the issue in question, the MIA 
and the Malaysia Institute of Certified Public Accountants (MICPA), who are the accounting 
governing bodies in Malaysia, agreed to establish an MIA/MACPA joint Taskforce on 
Auditor Independence in May 2002.   Both institutes agreed that the overall disadvantages of 
mandatory rotation of audit firms, including exorbitant costs, disruption and loss of 
accumulative knowledge, and a restriction on the freedom of companies to choose their own 
auditors, outweigh the benefits that may be derived from such rotation of audit firms (the 
Malaysian Institute of Accountants, 2002).  Therefore this study tries to prove that whether 
these suggestions can be use in the current situation in Malaysia. The regulators must 
emphasize the impact of auditor tenure to the audit quality especially if there is a negative 
relationship between auditor tenure and audit quality. If this happens, it can be said that long 
time auditors are deemed to impair their independence when auditing their clients.  
 
In addition, no empirical studies have been carried out in Malaysia regarding auditor tenure 
and audit quality. This study examines the local setting namely Malaysian companies listed 
on the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange (Main Board and Second Board).  Hopefully, this 
study will give new understanding on the  auditing profession in Malaysia.  The results from 
this study will be useful for the regulators in improving the independence of the auditor. 
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Finally, the results can be used by the companies to improve both the effectiveness and 
efficiency of the audit that they undertake besides their relationship with the auditors in 
gaining the public trust. 
 
Auditor quality has been concerned in recent times due to several mega corporate scandals in 
the United States and lately in Europe.  For that reason our study contributes to the body of 
knowledge on current situations of audit quality by examining the financially distressed 
companies in Malaysia.  Besides, we introduce a new variable which is the auditor change 
variable.  This study would then serves as a feedback to the regulators regarding the 
mandatory rotation and the auditors’ independence in Malaysia. 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW & HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
 
This section highlights several studies that utilized auditor tenure as a variable and its effect 
to the audit quality. Deis and Giroux (1992) found that the audit quality decreases as auditor 
tenure increase.  The reason they gave was that the auditors become less challenge and 
therefore less likely to use innovative audit procedures and finally fail to maintain their 
competency. 
 
Similarly, Stice (1991) found the relationship between auditor tenure and a lawsuit against 
the auditor.  In the study, he found that auditor tenure was shorter for those audit 
engagements that resulted in a lawsuit against the auditor.  This happened in the case of 
control sample that matched only on time period.  However, it is not true when compared to 
an industry pair-matched control sample.   
 
De Angelo (1981b) also mentioned that the quality of auditors divided to two parts.  First is 
to detect anything misleading in financial statements of the client and secondly is to report 
the misleading information.  The first quality is regarding the competence and skills of the 
auditors to detect any fraud while the second one is related to the auditors’ independence.  In 
the case of long time auditor, it is argued that the auditor’s independence will be reduced 
because the auditor feels comfortable with the clients whether in term of revenue and also 
their expertise on the clients’ system.  Subsequently they will not report any misleading 
information to ensure there is no any change of auditors. In that case, an unqualified report 
(clean report) will be issued. 
 
In the point of view of regulators, long association between a corporation and an accounting 
firm may lead to impair their independence (Geiger and Raghunandan, 2002).  The United 
States regulators emphasized on this since 1976 under the Metcalf Committee report (the 
United States Senate, 1976) which suggested that mandatory auditor rotation as a way for the 
accounting profession to bolster their independence from clients.  However, this was only a 
suggestion.  Perhaps the current act, which has been enacted in the United States, the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act 2002 (SOX) will remedy this.   Under this act, auditor independence is 
regulated through audit partner rotation but not for the case of audit firm.  The lead audit or 
coordinating partner and the reviewing partner must be rotated in every 5 years.  Similarly,  
in Malaysia, the MIA suggested 5 years to rotate the lead audit partner.  
 
The studies of on auditor tenure could not be separated from the auditor switching studies.  
Many studies found that financially distressed firms were more likely to switch auditors than 
non distressed companies due to the reason that these types of companies need to hire a new 
quality of auditor compared to the previous one (Krishnan, 1994; and Krishnan and Stephens, 
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1995).  Sinason, Jones, and Shelton (2001) found that auditor tenure is longer for clients who 
received unqualified or unqualified-modified opinions.  Interestingly, in Malaysia, Hashanah 
(1998) found such behaviour is less apparent using data from 1975-1995. In one extreme 
case, the auditor was not even replaced after issuing five consecutive times of a disclaimer 
opinion to a client.  But, the results statistically equivalent, meaning that no evidence exists to 
indicate that auditor tenure is longer for clients with unqualified opinions.    
 
Figure 1 shows relevant studies on the audit tenure variable in relation to the auditors’ 
reporting. It can be said that, in empirically studies, the audit tenure variable is still new 
though debates on audit tenure have gone through times and tides for four decades. Results 
are inconclusive like many other researches in auditing.  Thus prompting for a need of a new 
study in a new environment especially in new emerging markets like Malaysia.   
 
Insert Figure 1 About Here  
 
Similarly, Krishnan (1994); and Krishnan and Stephens (1995) found  that switching 
companies were no more likely to have their modified report removed than were similar 
companies that did not switch auditors.  Therefore, it is argued that if the financially 
distressed firms still maintain the same auditors and by the same time, if an unqualified report 
is issued, it may be perceived that the auditors’ independence is impaired.  In addition, 
studies by Teoh and Lim (1996) found that retention of auditors for over five years would 
influence and impair audit independence.  
 
It is argued that the longer the auditors audit their clients the larger that lead to such close 
relationship between the audit firms and clients.  Thus would inhibit auditors’ power in audit 
conflicts i.e. going concern issues. Deis & Giroux (1992), O’Keefe et al. (1994) and 
Raghunandan et al. (1994) confirmed that longer auditor tenure would decrease audit quality. 
Similarly, Vanstraelen (2000) found negatively relationship between auditor tenure and 
opinion and then again provide support for mandatory audit firm rotation. In addition, 
Anandarajan, La Salle and Anandarajan (2001) found evidence that the shorter auditor tenure 
the more likely the clients receive a disclaimer going concern opinion. Longer tenure auditors 
are likely to only modify the opinion of an audit report when the issue of going concern is at 
stakes, meaning that, the auditors are less conservative.  In an experimental setting, Dopuch, 
King, and Schwartz (2001) found the auditors are less likely to impose a biased report if 
rotation is required, but it also increases the magnitude of investment to improve financial 
reporting quality. 
  
In contrast, Petty & Cuganesan (1996) argued that when mandatory auditor rotation is 
regulated, clients might be forced to accept a lower quality of service from an auditor who is 
a generalist, especially if fewer auditors invest in specialized industries such as banking, 
insurance or natural resources.  Moreover, Louwers (1998); and Johnson, Khurana, and 
Reynolds (2002) found no evidence of reduced financial quality for longer audit firm’s 
tenures. Recently, Geiger and Raghunandan (2002) studied a sample of 117 bankrupt 
companies and suggested that auditors may be more influenced by their newly obtained 
clients in the earlier years of the engagement.  In addition, Chi and Huang (2004) found that 
audit firm tenure helps to produce higher earnings quality due to familiarity effect, but 
excessive familiarity results in lower earnings quality.  Furthermore, they found that audit 
firm tenure plays a key role in the transmission of learning experience.  Thus, audit 
independence issue or audit competence issue is crucial and problematic  in early years of 
engagement and not in later years. 
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Overall, prior researches suggested that there should not be any fast rules on mandatory audit 
firm rotation. In United States, many auditors have served their clients for more than twenty 
years (Geiger & Raghunandan, 2002) and some since listed in the stock exchange. In such 
cases, auditors would be under greater pressure from clients and thus would unlikely issue a 
going concern opinion. However, auditors may be argued to have in-depth knowledge and 
thus would be able to defend themselves if such difficult situation arises.  In addition, they 
would be able to advise their clients if going concern assumption is no longer appropriate.  
Therefore, the derived hypothesis as follows (in null form): 
 
H01a: Ceteris paribus, there is no significant relationship between audit firm tenure 
and the issuance of going concern opinion 
 
H01b: Ceteris paribus, there is no significant relationship between companies, which 
never change their auditors since listed in Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange 
(KLSE) and the issuance of going concern opinion 
 
RESEARCH DESIGN AND SAMPLE SELECTION 
 
Sample and Data 
 
The sample comprises all non-finance distressed companies identified using a list of financial 
indicators under ISA 570 (revised) Going Concern.  The data is primarily from annual reports 
of public listed companies in KLSE.  The year of 2002 is selected since the ISA 570 (revised) 
came into force from 1 January 2002. We found 187 companies, which fulfilled the distress 
characteristics.   
 
Explanations of the Model 
 
This study replicates the model from the previous established studies in going concern audit 
opinion (see for example, Louwers, 1998; and Geiger and Raghunandan , 2002). 
 
The research model (in logistic form) is as follows: 
GC=    a + b1TENURE + b2 AUDITSWITCH + b3 BIGFIVE + b4 ACOMOUT + b5 ZFC  
              + b6 DEFAULT + b7 LOGASSETS + e 
 
The measurements of the variables are as follows: 
Dependent Variable Measurement 
GC   = 1 if auditor issued going-concern opinion, else 0 
 
Hypotheses Variables 
TENURE            =  Audit firm tenure in number of years  
AUDITSWITCH       =  Dummy variable, 1 if client never change its auditor at least   
once since listed in the KLSE, 0 otherwise  
 
 
Control Variables Measurement  
                                                 
13  Beginning 31 August 1993, companies seeking listing on KLSE are required to have audit committee under 
s15A of KLSE listing requirement.  
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BIGFIVE           =  Dummy variable, 1 if the auditor is the Big Five firm, and else  
0 
ACOMOUT              =  Dummy variable, 1 if the audit committee is comprised of all  
non-executive directors, else 0 
ZFC   =  Probability of bankruptcy calculated from Zmijewski Financial  
Condition (1984) 
DEFAULT  = Dummy variable having a value of 1 if the company is  
in default, else 0 
LOGASSETS  =  Natural log of total assets of clients 
e                     = Error term of residual 
a i             = constant (i = 0) 
b    = coefficients (i =1,2,3,4,5,6,7) 
 
Variables Definition and Discussion 
 
Tenure and Audit Switch 
Tenure is the first hypothesis variable measured by the length of audit firm tenure in years 
since the KLSE was established. Audit firm tenure is measured by the length of years which 
audit firms audit their clients (Louwers, 1998 and Vanstraelen, 2000). In the sensitivity 
analyses, we use logarithmic transformation to correct for non-normality in the distribution of 
the data (see Geiger & Raghunandan, 2002).  Similarly, we argue that auditors are in greater 
pressures from clients especially if the auditors have served the clients since the clients listed 
in the stock exchange for many years.  Due to the mixed theories and empirical findings, we 
do not provide direction for this relationship.  
 
Big Five 
DeAngelo (1981b) theorized that larger audit firms have superior audit quality since they 
invest more in audit technology and training. Thus, in term of audit competence, it could be 
argued that larger audit firm would be more accurately able to detect problems related to 
going-concern assumption than smaller audit firms. In term of audit independence, larger 
audit firms have more spreads of clients’ base when auditing listed companies than smaller 
audit firms (See Atef & Ayoib, 2000) and thus have less dependence on a particular client.  In 
addition, Palmrose (1988) found that the larger audit firms were less likely to be involved in 
audit-related litigation than the smaller one. Alternatively, Big Five firms have greater risk of 
losing reputation, which may motivate them to be more objectivity when making an audit 
reporting decision. Anandarajan et al. (2001) however, found no evidence of auditor size 
effect on auditor going concern reporting. Such finding warrant a further study, perhaps in 
Malaysia, since the public perceive differences exist in many aspects of auditing between 
larger firms and smaller firms including going concern assumption.  In addition, this variable 
is never tested in Malaysia environment (see Atef, Suhaimi, and Zakimi, 2002).    
 
Audit Committees 
Audit committee has been made mandatory in Malaysia since 19933. It is more likely that 
interaction between audit committee with external auditors may influence auditor’s choice of 
issuing going-concern4. An independent audit committee could help mitigate such pressure 
by supporting the auditor in disputes with management (Knapp, 1987). Hence, we expect 
some characteristics of board of directors, especially non-executive directors, as public 
                                                 
4 Among main functions of audit committee are reviewing audit planning and audit procedures and discussing 
audit findings and report (MIA recommended practice guide on Audit Committee & section 344A KLSE listing 
requirements). 
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watchdog and audit committee will influence auditor’s choice in going-concern.  Knapp 
(1987) found that in a major audit disputes, audit committee members tended to support the 
auditors rather than the management.   Similarly, Atef et al. (2000) found evidence that 
independent audit committee is associated with going concern opinion.  
 
We argue that placing strategic executive directors on the committee may shadow a 
measurement of independence of audit committee by proportion of outside directors.  We 
believe a higher independence of audit committee, which is measured by non-existence of 
powerful directors especially the managing director and executive directors (see also Carcello 
& Neal, 2000) would lend better support for auditors.  Thus, independent audit committees 
will ensure that the audit opinion really gives a picture the situation of that company. 
 
Probability of Bankruptcy 
Several studies found that a positively relationship between going concern opinion and 
probability of bankruptcy of a company.  This is due to the fact that, the higher probability of 
bankruptcy, the higher the need of the auditors to issue going-concern opinion. Regardless of 
whatever bankruptcy model being employed in prior researches (see among others, Hopwood 
et al., 1989; Vanstraelen, 2000) in going concern opinion, the results suggest that auditors do 
assess distress condition of their clients. Prior research in Malaysia by Atef et al. (2002) used 
Zmijewski Financial Condition (ZFC) that suggested by Zmijewski (1984) and they found 
significant result. Similarly, we employ ZFC to measure financial distress of the companies.  
Kleinman & Anandarajan (2001) suggested that a score, which exceed 0.28, is considered as 
financial distress. Therefore, there is a positive association between probability of bankruptcy 
and going concern opinion. 
 
Default 
In this present study, a company is classified a default company if the company is either in 
payment default or technical default or has breached loan covenants.  Therefore, we employ 
dichotomous variable as suggested by Chen & Church (1992). Going concern is associated 
with default status (refer Atef et al, 2002). This due to the fact that default status would send 
strong bad signal which potential and successful negotiation with banks or other creditors 
would be unlikely. In the absence of such supports, companies under financial distress would 
hardly stay as going-concern company in the future accounting period. Thus, there is a 
positive association between default status and of going-concern opinion. 
 
Client Size 
Total assets is used in the present study due to the amount of assets, that more consistent 
before and after the 1997 crisis compared to revenues. However, Atef et al. (2002) found no 
evidence that size of clients measured by total assets has association with the type of going 
concern audit report. Other measurements of client size include market capitalization and a 
mixture of sales and assets. This variable is transformed to logarithmic data to control for 
non-normality.  Consistent with the previous research, a negative relationship between this 
independent variable and going concern opinion is expected (Geiger and Raghunandan, 
2002).  
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RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS 
 
Descriptive Results 
 
From 187 companies, Arthur Andersen (AA) and Ernst Young (EY) audited 42.17% of 
distressed companies. Since the merger between those firms in July 2002, almost half of these 
troubled companies lie with this new EY. All Big Five accounts 70.28% of the KLSE 
troubled firms. This figure is comparable with their total shares of the KLSE companies (See 
Atef and Ayoib, 2000). 77.5% or 145 of these companies received going concern audit 
opinion. Thus many problems and critics would lie in the case of non-receiving going 
concern opinion. 
 
T-test in the Table 1 confirms this preliminary finding that Big Five is different than non Big 
Five in terms of audit opinion and tenure. Big Five generally have longer audit tenure and 
issued a slightly more going concern opinion than non-Big Five. However, this is only a 
univariate test-result, which needs to be interpreted with caution. Therefore, a model that 
combines multiple variables such as regression procedure would unveil whether such 
relationship holds true in a multivariate analysis.   
 
Insert Table 1 About Here  
 
Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) figures are closed to unitary and thus conclude that 
multicollinearity5 poses minimal threat to further regression analysis. In addition, further 
inspection using the condition index proves prior VIF test.   Besides, Table 2 of correlation 
matrix shows that multicollinearity is minimal. The results in Table 2, suggest that the largest 
absolute value is only 0.266 between TENURE and AUDITSWITCH, with significant level 
at 0.01. 
 
Insert Table 2 About Here  
 
Going concern opinion has strong and significantly correlation with audit tenure (r = 0.229), 
default status (r = 0.647), outside audit committee (r=0.154) and probability of bankruptcy (r 
= 0.171). In contrast, correlation analysis do not show any significant relationship between 
Big Five variable and going concern opinion variable. As mentioned above, univariate results 
should be read with caution and act as a complement to multivariate analysis of logistic 
regression.  
 
Multivariate Regression 
 
The results are similar as Geiger & Raghunandan (2002). Table 3 shows that audit firm 
tenure and audit switching variables have statistically significant relationship (at-two-tailed) 
with the issuance of going concern opinion. Hence, H01a and H01b are rejected. This means 
that the longer an audit firm audits a client the higher probability the auditor issuing going 
concern opinion.  The result does not support the frequent arguments of negative audit tenure 
effects made by public and business community.  However, our finding reveals that if a client 
never changes its auditor since listed in stock exchange, then the possibility of receiving 
clean opinion is higher.  These results support Chi and Huang (2004) who suggested that 
familiarity effect produce higher earnings quality due to familiarity effect, but excessive 
                                                 
5 VIF ranges from 1.0408 to 1.441 
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familiarity results in lower earnings quality (even the situation are difference between this 
study and Chi and Huang, 2004, similar proxy of audit firm tenure was used by both studies 
to examine the role of audit firm whether in going concern opinion or earning aspect).  
 
Insert Table 3 About Here  
 
Moreover, there is no evidence that audit firm size as surrogated by Big Five and non-Big 
Five dichotomous classifications unlike in Behn et al., (2001) and audit committee 
independence have significant influence over auditor reporting decision. Thus, argument of 
perceived high quality by DeAngelo (1981b) is not apparent as generally supported in the 
case of audit fees research. It is suggested not to use a dichotomous value in audit reporting 
studies (as a proxy of audit quality) unlike in audit fees studies where the perceived 
difference of audit quality can be captured by using dichotomous value of Big Five and non 
Big Five.   Furthermore, Raman (2004) found no significant difference of the audit quality 
between Big Four and non-Big Four in Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) 
which includes Malaysia even prior to the 1997 financial crisis compared to their 
counterparts in the United States.6  He used earnings conservatism as proxy for audit quality. 
 
77.55% of the sample is companies, which have audit tenure of five years or more. We then 
conducted sensitivity analyses using a dichotomous value of tenure of more than three years, 
more than five years and found those results still holds. Thus, the call for mandatory audit 
rotation may not yield what it hopes for. We would say our results do not support audit firm 
rotation and thus change of auditor should be made for necessary and reasonable grounds 
such as in the event of non-performance of auditors or change of substantial and controlling 
shareholders and others. 
 
Our results also consistent with Atef et al. (2002) that related to debt-default status and 
serious financial distress variable.  Both variables are strong determinants of auditor’s 
decision in issuing going concern in Malaysia. These findings also contribute to high pseudo 
R2 but it is still comparable with prior researches (Geiger & Raghunandan, 2002 had pseudo 
R2 0.33, Louwers, 1998 had pseudo R2 0.44).  In addition, assets of the companies are proved 
to be insignificant factor in going concern issues unlike in many of audit fees studies. There 
are several explanations.  First is the auditor may investigate the quality of the assets and not 
just “any assets”. It is quite possible, if the distressed company has significant portion of 
assets, which have higher market value and demand such as investment in listed shares or has 
properties of high value that would fare and survive much better than others. Thus auditor 
may not issue a going concern opinion to such companies. Secondly, a better proxy for size in 
the case of going concern opinion such as revenue or turnover of the companies may yield  
better results.  
 
Insert Table 4 About Here  
 
Table 4 shows minimal improvement in term of accuracy from Atef et al. (2002). The model 
has high prediction power of 88.8%. Type II (6.7%) is lower than type I (37.5%) error, which 
is deem not a serious problem. Type II error leads to auditors to give a clean opinion whereby 
they should give a going concern opinion. Thus we can say that most of distressed companies 
in Malaysia received “warning” from their auditor by issuing a going concern opinion. 
                                                 
6 Nowadays, there are only four largest audit firms called Big Four (KPMG, PricewaterhouseCoopers, Ernst and 
Young and Deloitte and Touche.  The current study still uses Big Five because Arthur Andersen was still 
available in the year of 2002.  
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Interestingly, it seems that in Malaysia, auditors are skeptical or very conservative on going 
concern assumption made by directors and thus they made lower type II error compare to  
type I error.  High type I error may lead to self- fulfilling theory which suggest that their 
clients may face difficulties in obtaining credit or financing facilities from bankers or 
investors. The auditors do take to the account these factors in their going concern opinion 
decision.  Such events may cause higher cost to the auditors i.e. clients switch their auditors 
but Hashanah (1998) found that going concern opinion alone would not precipitate such 
effect. Future research on value relevance of going concern audit opinion may unveil this 
effect.  
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
Mandatory audit rotation debates came from the arguments that long audit tenure would 
create cozy relationship between auditors and clients and thus would lead to audit failure such 
as in the case of going concern opinion. We found no market wide evidence to support that 
argument in Malaysia but instead we found that longer audit tenure has positive significant 
association with auditor’s reporting decision. In addition, we found that auditors in Malaysia 
made less serious error (type II) or audit failure compared to our model.  However, we did 
not test on other type of audit failure such as qualified opinion of non-going concern issues. 
In this study, we did not discriminate the different types of going concern opinion including 
modified opinion, qualified opinion or disclaimer opinion as stated in ISA 570 (revised 
2000). 
 
Our results also show that if a client never changess its auditor since listed in KLSE, there is 
a tendency to issue a clean opinion though the client suffers apparent financial problems.  
Overall, it can be said, “auditor change would do well, but forcing an unrealistic audit firm 
rotation might not yield what it hopes for”.   Therefore,  we echo the importance of self-
regulation and Laissez-faire practice in Malaysia as a better alternative than a mandatory 
auditor rotation. Perhaps current national undertakings by regulators such as strengthening 
audit committee in term of independence and competence and peer audit review process by 
the MIA would inhibit unethical audit process in Malaysia. 
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FIGURE 1 
Studies on Audit Tenure to Auditor Reporting 
 
Studies Measurement of 
audit tenure 
Country Sample Audit tenure 
to auditor 
reporting 
Geiger & 
Raghunandan (2002) 
Natural log of  
number of years 
U.S. 117 stressed & 
bankrupt companies 
Positive 
Anandarajan, La 
Salle & Anandarajan 
(2001) 
Dichotomous 
value, 1 for audit 
tenure of three 
years or less & 0 
otherwise 
U.S. Two partition of 216 
for financial service 
& 307 from non-
financial service 
industry 
Negative 
Vanstraelen (2000) Number of years Belgium 146 match sample of 
stressed & non-
stressed non-
bankrupt companies 
Negative 
Louwers (1998) Number of years U.S. 808 stressed non-
bankrupt companies 
Not 
significant 
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TABLE 1 
 t-test of B5 and Non-B5 
 
Variables B5 (means) Non B5 
(means) 
t-value  Sig. 
TENURE  
(in years) 
10.5 7.26 2.820 0.005* 
GOING 
CONCERN 
0.82 0.70 1.863 0.064* 
ACOMOUT 0.33 0.26 0.910 0.364 
DEFAULT 0.66 0.61 0.657 0.512 
ZFC 15.63 22.99 -0.805 0.422 
AUDITSWITCH  0.44 0.41 0.388 0.698 
TASSETS (RM) 679,922,418 471,684,583 0.767 0.444 
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TABLE 2 
Correlation Matrix 
 
 
  GC TENURE AUDITSWITCH BIGFIVE ACOMOUT  ZFC DEFAULT  TASSETS 
GC 1 .229(**) -.098 .128 .154(*) .171(*) .647(**) .003 
TENURE .229(**) 1 .266(**) .201(**) .122 -.033 .249(**) .085 
AUDITSW ITCH -.098 .266(**) 1 -.033 -.031 .034 -.055 -.210(**) 
BIGFIVE .128 .201(**) -.033 1 .039 -.060 .043 .055 
ACOMOUT  .154(*) .122 -.031 .039 1 .154(*) .114 .039 
ZFC .171(*) -.033 .034 -.060 .154(*) 1 .199(**) -.101 
DEFAULT  .647(**) .249(**) -.055 .043 .114 .199(**) 1 -.055 
TASSETS .003 .085 -.210(**) .055 .039 -.101 -.055 1 
         
 
**  Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
*  Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
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TABLE 3 
 Logistic Regression, n =187 
 
 
Variables  Predicted Sign B S.E. Wald Sig. Exp(B) 
TENURE ? .169 .097 3.012 .083 1.184 
AUDITSWITCH ? -1.094 .660 2.749 .097 .335 
BIGFIVE + .629 .653 .928 .335 1.877 
ACOMOUT + .319 .696 .210 .647 1.375 
ZFC + .606 .203 8.953 .003 1.833 
DEFAULT + 3.367 .820 16.851 .000 28.991 
LOGASSETS - -.016 .491 .001 .975 .984 
Constant +/- -1.287 4.071 .100 .752 .276 
 
a  Variable(s) entered on step 1: TENURE, AUDITSWITCH, BIGFIVE, ACOMOUT, ZFC, DEFAULT,  
    LOGASSET. 
 
Cox & Snell R2= 0.464, Nagelkerke R2= 0.714, Hosmer & Lemeshow = 0.947 
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TABLE 4 
 Classification Table 
 
 
Classification Table a 
32 9 78.0 
12 134 91.8 
37.5% 6.7% 88.8 
auditor's actual opinion 
standard 
going concern 
Overall Percentage 
standard going concern 
Percentage 
Correct 
Model's predicted opinion 
The cut value is .500 a.  
